| 北京共识全文(The Beijing Consensus) |
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发表时间：2006-02-25
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The Beijing Consensus
Joshua Cooper Ramo
The Foreign Policy Centre
FM.qxd 5/11/04 4:12 PM Page iii
First published 2004 by the Foreign Policy Centre
The Foreign Policy Centre
The Mezzanine
Elizabeth House
39 York Road
London
SE1 7NQ
Email info@fpc.org.uk
www.fpc.org.uk
All rights reserved
ISBN 1 903558 35 2
Copywright The Foreign Policy Centre May 2004
Typesetting by – String Information Services
FM.qxd 5/11/04 4:12 PM Page iv
Contents
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: NOTES ON THE NEW
PHYSICS OF CHINESE POWER 1
Introduction: The New Math 1
SOME USEFUL AXIOMS OF
CHINESE DEVELOPMENT 7
The Heisenberg Society 7
The Uses of Density 13
“Green Cat, Transparent Cat” 21
GLOBALISATION WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:
THE ENERGY TRANSFER PROBLEM 26
Recoil Energy: The Suitability Test 28
The Localisation Lemma: Culture’s Chain Reaction 31
The Yuan Magnet 35
Just Say No, Just Say Yes 37
An Uneasy Decade 42
Security Step Changes 43
Command of the Commons 51
“DEALING WITH CHINA” 55
APPENDIX 61
Contents v
FM.qxd 5/11/04 4:12 PM Page v
The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the
New Physics of Chinese Power
Introduction: The New Math
The first thing most people noticed about the Danish scientist
Tycho Brahe was the metal tip on the end of his nose, an expensive
attempt to undo some of the damage from a vogue in German
universities of the 1500s for saber dueling. But Brahe’s silver nose
was a symbol of sorts too. He was a man who was good at sniffing
out holes in the theories that were supposed to explain how the
world worked. He looked, for instance, at the predictions by the
best scientists of his time of where exactly the planets were
supposed to be on a certain day. What he saw over and over was that
the predictions failed. Funny things happened in the sky: Mars
appeared to move backwards in its orbit, comets crashed through
the celestial domes that were supposed to hold the planets in place,
the moon skipped a long-predicted eclipse. This was because the
primary theories of Brahe’s day were based on occasional, imperfect
observations of celestial bodies that were in constant motion.
The theories were great, as a result, at predicting the previous’
nights planetary movements, the scientific equivalent of forecasting
yesterday’s weather. So Brahe devoted most of his life to the obsessive
study of the actual movement of the planets. He lived with the
planets, the stars and other heavenly bodies every night, meticulously
recording their every perturbation at a level of accuracy never
before seen. In 1572 and 1577 he made two observations that
changed science – the first was of a new star, the second of a comet.
Both objects were indisputably higher than the moon, a fact that
demonstrated that the heavens were not, as philosophers as far back
as Aristotle had argued, immutably divided from the earth. Further,
he concluded, if the comets were in the heavens, they must move
through the heavens. That demolished the old idea that the planets
The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power 1
Chaps-New.qxd 5/11/04 12:23 PM Page 1
moved on invisible spheres. Galileo, Keppler and generations of scientists
followed Brahe’s observations into a whole new physics. His
ideas changed everything. And they could be summarized in a single
notion: if you wanted to understand how the sky worked, you
should be more concerned about the motion of heavenly bodies than
their destination.
It’s tempting to think about what destination China might reach in
20 years. Will it be a seething pot of nationalist hate? A rich,
super-large Singapore, warlike only in the board room? The common
conceit of most non-Chinese policy planners is that in 20
years China will be a “near peer” power, bumping up against the
United States in terms of economic and possibly military might.
Thus, this logic runs, the next 20 years must be devoted to either
engaging China to shape its rise or working to contain the country
so it doesn’t acquire more power than the current global power
leaders. But the fact is that no one knows what China will look
like in 20 years.
Such speculation is somewhat helpful, but no basis for theory.
And it completely misses the most essential observation: China’s
rise is already reshaping the international order by introducing a
new physics of development and power. The things that have
always made policymakers think that China is a 20-year-awayproblem
are not the essential components of China’s blossoming
power. To measure Chinese power based on the tired rules of how
many aircraft carriers she has or on per-capita GDP leads to devastating
mis-measurement.1 China is in the process of building
2 The Beijing Consensus
1 See for two diverse examples of this approach, Nye, Joseph S. Jr and Owens,
William in “America’s Information Edge”, Foreign Affairs March/April 1996 or
Roy, Denny, “China’s Reaction to American Predominance” in Survival, Autumn
2003. See also the U.S. 1997 Quadrennial Defense Report, which asserts a
“strategic competitor” to the US will emerge after the first 15 years of the
21st century.
Chaps-New.qxd 5/11/04 12:23 PM Page 2
the greatest asymmetric superpower the world has ever seen, a
nation that relies less on traditional tools of power projection than
any in history and leads instead by the electric power of its example
and the bluff impact of size.
What is happening in China at the moment is not only a model for
China, but has begun to remake the whole landscape of international
development, economics, society and, by extension, politics.
While the US is pursuing unilateral policies designed to protect
United States interests, China is assembling the resources to
eclipse the US in many essential areas of international affairs and
constructing an environment that will make US hegemonic action
more difficult. The point of this piece is not to judge China’s rise
as good or bad. I will leave the discussion about how to handle
China’s rise to the ideologically electric engagement/containment
debate, though I will show in a moment why ideas like engagement
and containment are outdated in regard to China. Rather
what I wish to do here is simply to outline the shape of China’s
new power basis and solidify the claim that when measured in
terms of comprehensive national power, China is already a rival of
the United States in many important areas. I will also briefly
address the potential implications of this approach if allowed to
continue. In global community terms, the person who walks
around rattling locks, checking alarms and catching the bad guys
is called the policeman. The person who worries about everything
else is called the mayor.
To the degree China’s development is changing China it is important;
but what is far more important is that China’s new ideas are
having a gigantic effect outside of China. China is marking a path
for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not
simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the
international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent,
to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with
a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new
The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power 3
Chaps-New.qxd 5/11/04 12:23 PM Page 3
physics of power and development the Beijing Consensus. It
replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic
theory made famous in the 1990s for its prescriptive,
Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations how to
run themselves. The Washington Consensus was a hallmark of endof-
history arrogance; it left a trail of destroyed economies and bad
feelings around the globe. China’s new development approach is
driven by a desire to have equitable, peaceful high-quality growth,
critically speaking, it turns traditional ideas like privatisation and
free trade on their heads. It is flexible enough that it is barely classifiable
as a doctrine. It does not believe in uniform solutions for
every situation. It is defined by a ruthless willingness to innovate
and experiment, by a lively defense of national borders and interests,
and by the increasingly thoughtful accumulation of tools of
asymmetric power projection. It is pragmatic and ideological at the
same time, a reflection of an ancient Chinese philosophical outlook
that makes little distinction between theory and practice. Though it
is decidedly post-Deng Xiaoping in structure, the Beijing
Consensus still holds tightly to his pragmatic idea that the best path
for modernisation is one of “groping for stones to cross the river,”
instead of trying to make one-big, shock-therapy leap. Most important,
it is both the product of and defined by a society that is changing
so fast that few people, even those inside China, can keep up
with it. Change, newness and innovation are the essential words of
power in this consensus, rebounding around journal articles, dinner
conversations and policy debates in China with mantra-like regularity.
Though much of the thinking reflected here was under
discussion in Chinese think tanks and government centres in the
post-Asian crisis period, it has only begun to be implemented in the
last 12 months. My analysis of that process is based on more than
one hundred off-the-record discussions with leading thinkers in
Chinese universities, think thanks and governm |
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